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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HASI{ELL X. BATES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JI~I~IIE SI~IPSON, 
Defendant, 
\Y. J. SArXDERS, 
Defendant, Cross-Complainant 
and Respondent, 
THE E:JIPLOYERS LIABILITY 
ASSrRANCE CORPORATION, 
LTD., a corporation, 
Defendant, Cross-Complainant 
and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 
7686 
CROSS-COMPLAIN ANT AND RESPONDENT 
W. J. SAUNDERS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The lower court found the facts in this case to be, 
in brief, that one Jimmie Simpson sold a car to one 
Haskell N. Bates and thereafter disappeared without 
having obtained a title to the car for Mr. Bates. Simpson 
was a bonded dealer and the Employers Liability Assur-
ance Corporation, Ltd., was the surety on the bond of 
Mr. Simpson. As a direct result of Simpson's failure 
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to carry out his duties as a dealer, Mr. Bates suffered 
damages and W. J. Saunders, who financed the transac-
tion, suffered damages. The court awarded a decree 
against the surety, Employers Liability Assurance Cor-
poration, Ltd., in favor of Mr. Bates and in favor of 
Mr. Saunders. It is from this decree that the Employers 
Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., prosecutes this 
appeal. 
W. J. Saunders, defendant, cross-complainant and 
now respondent, is in substantial disagreement with 
the statement of facts set forth by appellant, and finds 
points of difference with the statement of facts appear-
ing in the brief of respondent Bates, and therefore, 
believes it desirable to make the following statement of 
facts based on the evidence adduced at the trial. 
Respondent, W. J. Saunders, and Jimmie Simpson 
were each licensed and bonded used-car dealers under 
the laws of the State of Utah (R. 12, Par. 2, R. 28, R. 41 
F2, R. 50 F. 2 and 3). In the interest of economy, Saun-
ders and Simpson did business from the same used-car 
lot at 999 South Main Street in Salt Lake City, Utah 
(R. 167). They were not partners, and there was no 
evidence that they shared profits or losses (R.168). 
Each had his own cars to sell, and when one of them 
sold a car belonging to the other, in contrast to splitting 
of profits, the one whose car was sold paid the one who 
sold it a fiat fee of $25.00 (R. 167-168). 
On November 5, 1949, Haske! N. Bates, plaintiff 
and respondent, purchased from Jimmie Simpson a 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19:1:7 CheYrolet Fleetline Sedan for the suin of $1,345.00 
(R. 76). All of the transaction with respect to the sale 
of this car was between Bates and Simpson. Bates did 
not have any dealings with Saunders at the time the 
car was sold (R. 76, 77, 78, 79, 101, 102, 106, 107, 123, 
1~:1:, 125). At the time of the sale Bates signed a pur-
chase agreement, four copies, in blank.. He did this for 
the purpose of financing the car (R. 125, 270 Ex. 1 and 
B. He received a copy of this purchase agreement 
from Simpson which he was unable to produce at the 
trial (R. 110). He also received a Used Car Order made 
out by Simpson ( R. 77-78, 270; Ex. A). 
Simpson was unable to finance the car and asked 
Saunders to finance it for him, which Saunders did 
through Strevell Paterson Finance Company (R. 153-
154). By financing the car Saunders could make a small 
sum of money by way of the reserves which would be 
earned if Bates paid out the contract, which reserve 
would amount to approximately $70.00 (R. 155), and 
since Saunders thought it was good paper, he bought 
the paper and financed the car (R. 155-156). 
The car was one which Simpson had brought in 
from the State of California where he had obtained it 
from Brokaw-Bauer, a California dealer. The title to 
the car was forwarded by Brokaw-Bauer in the name 
of Simpson to the Continental Bank, Central Branch 
(R. 140, 250, 251, 252, R. 270 Ex. 10 and 11). Saunders 
turned over the money secured through his financing of 
the car to Simpson, in payment for the contract he pur-
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chased from Simpson (R. 175, 270; Ex. 7). It was 
Simpson's responsibility to go to the bank and obtain 
the title to the car which Simpson has sold to Bates 
(R. 177-179). This Simpson failed to do, having appar-
ently pocketed the money and disappeared (R. 140, 171). 
Not at any time, prior to Simpson's disappearance, 
did Bates even attempt to contact W. J. Saunders, and 
in fact he did not contact Saunders until January 14, 
1950, after he had been unable to locate Simpson for a 
period of several weeks (R. 87), and when he did, he did 
so for information about Simpson (R. 116, 123-124). Be-
cause Simpson failed to pay the amount due to Brokaw-
Bauer to the Continental Bank on the draft there in 
Simpson's name, and thus release the title, Brokaw-
Bauer replevied the car through an action brought 
against Bates in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 93-97). At the 
time of this law suit, neither Bates nor Employers Lia-
bility Assurance Corporation, Ltd., looked to Saunders 
in connection with the transaction, and no effort was 
made to interplead Saunders in that action (R. 140-142). 
Saunders made no representations at any time in connec-
tion with this matter to anyone save Strevell Paterson 
Finance Company, and he paid to Strevell Paterson 
Finance Company the amout due on the car (R. 225-226). 
Saunders in order to cover the Bates contract which 
he re-negotiated with Strevell Paterson Finance Com-
pany, and which he guaranteed, authorized deductions 
to be made from his reserves accumulated with the 
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finance company, which deductions an1ounted to $867.75 
(R. 231). Thus Saunders was directly damaged in the 
amount of $St)7.75 as a result of Ji1nmie Si1npson's fail-
ure to acquit his duties as a dealer in Used Motor Ve-
hicles in accordance with the requirements of the law 
of this state (R. 183). 
The bond furnished by Jin1n1ie Simpson as required 
by law of a licensed dealer in used motor vehicles, and 
upon which bond the appellant was surety, was in full 
force and effect at the time of this transaction (R. 28, 
Par 3). The bond is conditioned that the motor vehicle· 
dealer, •·shall well and truly observe and comply with 
all the require1nents and provisions of THE ACT PRO-
VIDING FOR THE REGl'LATION AND CONTROL 
OF THE BrSIN"ESS OF DEALING IN MOTOR 
VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 
1949, and indemnify any and all persons, firms, and 
corporations for any loss suffered by reason of the. fraud 
or fraudulent representations m~de, or through the 
violation of any of the provisions of said Motor Vehicle 
Dealer's Act and shall pay all judgments and costs 
adjudged against said principal on account of fraud 
or fraudulent representations and for any violation or 
violations of said law during the time of said license, 
* * *" (R. 270, Ex. 12). The bond is, as required by 
statute, in the penal sum of $5,000.00 (R. 28, Par. 3). 
The respondent, W. J. Saunders, cross claimed against 
the aforesaid surety, Employers Liability Assurance 
Corporation, Ltd., for the loss which he suffered by 
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virtue of Jimmie Simpson having absconded with the 
funds turned over to him by Saunders, and failing to 
obtain and deliver a prope·r title to the motor vehicle 
which Simpson sold to Bates, as Simpson was required 
by law to do (R. 23, 24, 25). The lower court found in 
favor of Saunders and against the appellant (R. 51, 52, 
53), and entered judgment accordingly (R. 47, 48), in 
favor of Saunders for $867.75, together with his costs. 
The court similarly found in favor of the plaintiff Bates, 
and against the bonding company and entered judgment 
on the plaintiff's complaint as amended in favor of 
Bates in the sum of $933.52, together with his costs 
(R. 39-46). The court dismissed the cross-complaint of 
the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. 
against Saunders and dismissed the complaint against 
Saunders by Bates (R. 39, 48). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
An attempt to reply to the briefs submitted by 
counsel for appellant, and for respondent Bates, utiliz-
ing the same order of presentation of points and argu-
ment as followed in the respective briefs by them sub-
mitted does not result in a logical statement of the 
case of the respondent Saunders. It is believed that 
the court will find covered in the argument on the points 
as hereinafter set forth, the reply of respondent Saun-
ders to all of the points relied upon by the appellant 
and by respondent Bates. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT NO. I. 
RESPONDENT SAUNDERS IS NOT LIABLE .TO RE-
SPONDENT BATES OR TO APPELLANT FOR ANY INJURY 
RESULTING FROM THE F AlLURE OF SIMPSON TO COM-
PLY WITH THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS ACT. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT 
APPELLANT WAS LIABLE TO RESPONDENT SAUNDERS 
ON THE BOND OF JIMMIE SIMPSON IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
RESPONDENT SAUNDERS IS NOT LIABLE TO RE-
SPONDENT BATES OR TO APPELLANT FOR ANY INJURY 
RESULTING FROM THE F AlLURE OF SIMPSON TO COM-
PLY WITH THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS ACT. 
Jimmie Simpson was a licensed and bonded dealer 
in used motor vehicles under the laws of the State of 
Utah. This point was admitted by the pleadings of all 
of the parties to the action (R. 1, 12, 23), and was so 
found as a fact by the trial court (R. 50, F. 2), and 
the appellant was the surety on the bond of the said 
Jimmie Simpson, as admitted by the appellant in the 
Answer to the Complaint (R. 28), and as so found 
by the court (R. 52, F.10). 
Jimmie Simpson obtained from a California dealer 
in motor vehicles, Brokaw-Bauer, a 1947 Chevrolet 
Fleetline Sedan which Jimmie Simpson brought in to 
the state of Utah for the purpose of selling the same, 
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and this fact, so found by the court (R. 50), is supported 
by the evidence ( R. 97, 144, 186). 
Haskell N. Bates, respondent, saw the motor vehicle 
in question on the used car lot at 999 South Main Street 
in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, on November 5, 1949 
(R. 73, 76, 77). He talked to Jimmie Simpson about 
the car, and Simpson let him take the car and try it out 
(R. 77). Simpson quoted to Bates the price on the car 
and told him what he would allow to Bates on the 1941 
Ford which Bates was driving and which he wished to 
turn in on the purchase of the Chevrolet (R. 76). Bates 
being satisfied with the. car, asked Simpson to figure a 
contract on the purchase of the car (R. 77). This Simp-
son did and made out a purchase order (R. 77, 78; R. 
270, Ex. A), upon which Simpson wrote his name at the 
top and Bates signed at the bottom (R. 77, 78; R. 270, 
Ex. A). 
As a down· payment on the purchase of this 1947 
Chevrolet car, Bates turned in his 1941 Ford to Simpson 
and obtained the title to the Ford from his residence, 
which he endorsed in blank and turned over to Simpson 
on the same day, November 5, 1949 (R. 78, 79; R. 270, 
Ex. 2). Simpson thereafter sold the 1941 Ford which 
Bates turned in to him, to one Henry Oliver, as reflected 
by the records of the Tax Commission, Motor Vehicle 
Department (R. 270, Ex. 5). 
The same day, November 5, 1949, Simpson delivered 
the possession of the Chevrolet to Bates and Bates kept 
it until the same was replevied by Brokaw-Bauer in 
the forepart of 1950 (R. 92). 
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Saunders took no part in the sale which was made 
or in any of the subsequent transactions with respect 
to the securing of title, or license plate·s (R. 101, 102, 
106, 111, 113, 116). In connection with the sale, the testi-
mony of Bates, the purchaser, is clear and unequivocal. 
Quoting from the record at pages 101 and 102. 
Attorney: 
Q. Now, :Jir. Bates, at the time that you entered 
into this contract of purchase on this 194 7 
Chevrolet, was Mr. Saunders present~ 
Bates: 
A. N"o sir. 
Q. Did you have any dealing with Saunders in 
regard to the purchase of this car or the sale 
of the 1941 Ford which you turned in on this 
car, at any time~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You never had any dealings with him at all, 
did you~ 
A. No, sir. 
Again quoting from the record at page 123 we find 
Bates testifying as follows : 
Q. Now, Mr. Bates, at the time you purchased 
this car from whom did you make the pur-
chase~ 
A. I bought the car from Jimmie Simpson. 
Q. You didn't buy the car from Mr. Saunders~ 
That is Mr. Saunders sitting there, isn't it~ 
A. I didn't buy it from him. 
Q. He didn't have anything to do with the sale 
of the car, did he~ 
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A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Did Mr. Saunders at the time you purchased 
this c~r, November 5, 1949, make any repre-
sentatiOns to you at all concerning the car 
either to its condition or its title1 ' 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't even talk to him, did you 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You never talked to Mr. Saunders until 
January 14, 1950, isn't that right1 
A. That's right. 
It therefore appears from the testimony of Bates, 
the purchaser, that Saunders took no part in the actual 
sale of the car. Furthermore, it should be noted that a 
written contract is not necessary to a valid sale of a 
motor vehicle. All that is required by law is that the 
dealer: 
"* * * upon transferring a vehicle of a type 
subject to registration hereunde·r, whethe·r by 
sale, lease, or otherwise, to any person other than 
a manufacturer or dealer, shall immediately give 
written notice of such transfer to the department 
upon the official form provided by the depart-
ment." 57-3a-73, U.C.A. 1943. 
The report referred to by the section quoted above 
must be accompanied by the indicia of title properly 
endorsed. 57-3a-71 and 57-3a-76, U.C.A. 1943. 
Thus, in this case, as between Simpson and Bates, 
the sale could have been completed upon the delivery 
of the car and title by Simpson to Bates and furnishing 
10 
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of the statutory dealer's notice to the departrnent and 
upon the paYJ.nent of the purchase price in cash by Bates. 
In such event had there been son1e discrepancy in the 
title, or some failure to comply with the statutes on 
the part of Simpson, the liability would have been clear 
cut as between Bates, Simpson and the bonding cmu-
pany. 
If Saunders is to becmne involved in sharing liability 
with Simpson to Bates, there must be either a legal 
representatiYe authority by joint venture, partnership, 
as a joint tort feasor, or otherwise. We have already 
pointed out that Bates had no personal contact with 
Saunders. \Yith considerable repetition appellant has 
insisted that Saunders and Simpson were partners or 
at least joint adventurers. 
Our Supreme Court in Wasatch Livestock &!; Loan 
Co. vs. Lewis &!; Sharp, 35 P. 2d 835, 84 Utah 347, has 
said: 
"Joint adventure is in the nature of partner-
ship." 
And in Kaumans vs. White Star Gas &!; Oil Co., 63 
P. 2d 231, 92 Utah 24: 
"Joint venture is in the nature of partner-
ship and subject to the law of partnership so 
far as substantial rights of the parties are con-
cerned." 
There is an absolute absence of any showing on 
the part of appellant or of Bates, plaintiff below, that 
Simpson and Saunders ever shared profits or losses, 
or in any way acted as partners. The mere joint use 
11 
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of a lot upon which a sign was erected indicating the 
name of both Saunders and Simpson is far from suffi-
cient to prove partnership under any of the tests of the 
Uniform Partnership Act adopted by the State of Utah. 
It is particularly significant that these men each had 
separate licenses issued by the state of Utah to sell used 
cars, and the sign at the Jot on which the names of both 
Simpson and Saunders appeared, referred to the sep-
arate bonds of each of them, negativing any assumption 
that these men were operating jointly as a partnership. 
Bates testified that he noticed the sign. We quote from 
page 85 of the record. 
Attorney: 
Q. Did it have any signs on it~ 
Bates: 
A. Yes, it had a sign on the roof, on the front 
part of the roof. 
Q. What did it say~ 
A. W. J. Saunders and Jimmie Simpson. I be-
lieve it said, "Used Cars and Bonded Deal-
ers" under each one's name. 
Q. Under each one separately~ 
A. And give the number. The number of the 
bond. 
Bates further testified that on one occasion he be-
lieved Simpson had referred to Saunders as a partner, 
but at no time did Bates ever testify that he believed 
Saunders was Simpson's partner, and under these cir-
cumstances there could be no partnership by estoppel, 
there not having been any substantial representation 
12 
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and no reliance by Bates. 
The Uniform Partnership Act, as adopted in the 
state of Utah, provides : 
69-1-13. U.C.A. 19±3. Partner by Estoppel. 
" ( 1) \vnen a person by words spoken or 
written or by conduct represents himself, or con-
sents to another's representing him, to any one 
as a partner, in an existing partnership or with 
one or more persons not actual partners, he is 
liable to any such person to whom such repre~ 
sentation has been made who has on the faith of 
such representation given credit to the actual 
or apparent partnership, and, if he has made· 
such representation or consented to its being 
made in a public manner, he is liable to such 
person, whether the representation has or has 
not been made or communicated to such person 
so giving credit by, or with the knowledge of, the 
apparent partner making the representation or 
consenting to its being made." 
In this case we submit that the record does not 
contain any evidence or one word of testimony that 
Saunders at any time consented to the representation by 
Simpson that he was a partner, with Simpson, or that 
Saunders at any time publicly or to Bates ever held 
himself forth as a partner with Simpson. It will be 
noted that in the absence of public representation, under 
the statute quoted, the act of the party seeking to invoke 
the estoppel must have been taken in reliance on the 
existence of the partnership. In this case Bates testi-
fied that no representation whatever was made concern-
ing Saunders until after the transaction was completed 
13 
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except that a few days after he bought the car, he be-
lieved the following Monday, the day of the transaction 
having been a Saturday, when he returned to see Simp-
son, Simpson made mention of Saunders as being either 
his finance man, or his partner, Bates was not sure which 
(R. 84, 85). There is no showing at any point in the 
record of any act or omission to act by Bates, in reliance 
upon the representation by Simpson of Saunders as 
his partner. We again stress the fact that there is not 
one word in the record which indicates that Saunders 
had any knowledge of such representation ever at any 
time having been made. 
With equal emphasis and reiteration appellant fur-
ther contends that the respondent Saunders and Simpson 
were joint tort feasors. The baseless scurrility of appel-
lant's contentions at page 32 of his brief, wherein re-
spondent Saunders is referred to as a "conspirator" and 
by inference as a "thief" is not justified by the zealous-
ness of counsel to serve his client to the fullest extent. 
On the contrary it is unbecoming of ethical practice, and 
employs the tactics of a school boy, who, being outwitted 
and void of argument in desperation resorts to name 
calling. Neither opposing counsel has, or can cite, one 
instance of a false or fraudulent representation made 
by Saunders to Bates. In fact, all of . Bates' testimony 
was to the exact opposite, that he did not see Saunders ,, 
until January 14, 1950, two months and ten days after ~~i! 
this sale had been made by Simpson to Bates, and Bates 
had been in possession of the car all of that time (R. ·,~r 
90, 101, 123, 124). 
14 
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.. The essential elements required to sustain 
an action for deceit are, generally speaking, that 
a representation was made as a statement of fact, 
which was untrue and known to be untrue by 
the party making it, or else recklessly made; 
that it was 1nade with intent to deceive and for 
the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; and that he did in fact rely on it and 
was induced thereby to act to his injury or 
damage." American Jurisprudence, Vol. 23, P. 
773, Sec. 20. Also see H eckt v. Metzler, 14 Utah 
408, -!S P. 37. 
A careful scrutiny of the transcript and record 
will reveal that with the exception of the representation 
made by Simpson to Bates at the time when Bates re-
turned to see Simpson concerning the financing, that 
Saunders was ''his partner or finance man," (R. 84), the 
representations of Simpson were, so far as can be deter-
mined, truthful. The fact is that Simpson did have the 
right to sell the car, he apparently did have the intention 
of complying with his obligations as a dealer at the 
time that he sold the car to Bates, and he did have at 
his command the means of obtaining the necessary title 
to the car. The fact is, that in spite of the truth of the 
representations which were made, in spite of his appar-
ent honest intentions at the time of the sale, weeks later, 
Simpson absconded with the money obtained in the 
transaction and failed to carry out the burden imposed 
upon him by law as a dealer in used motor vehicles. 
The question of the truth or falsity of any of the rep-
resentations made by him is not conclusive of the issues 
to be decided in this case, for the liability on the bond 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
arises not alone from fraud, but from non compliance 
with the statute as well. The latter is made out, and by 
virtue of Simpson's failure both Bates and Saunders 
suffered loss. The statement in the brief of the appellant 
appearing at page 29, "It is apparent that the Trial 
Judge simply brushed over the law of deceit and fraud 
in an effort to hold the Bonding Company liable, without 
permitting it to recover against the real tort feasors 
on its indemnity agreement," is as illogical and untrue 
as is the analysis provided by the appellant in its brief 
on the law of the subject. By way. of illustration of this 
statement we wish to direct the court's attention to one 
instance of this kind in the brief of the appellant. There 
the appellant quotes from the Restatement of Torts, Vol. 
4, Pages 435, 436 and 439. In so doing appellant empha-
sizes a small portion of a sentence out of clause (c), "and 
is a substantial factor in causing the result," and then 
builds his argument on this emphasized passage paying 
no heed to the balance of the paragraph which completely 
changes the entire aspect of the problem. When read in 
its entirety, one finds that the gist of the offense recog-
nized by the Restatement as being a factor in constitut-
ing one ·a joint tort feasor is that the act of the party 
sought to be bound as a joint tort feasor must by itself 
constitute a breach of duty and this act must then be a 
substantial factor in causing the result. The importance 
of the entire context cannot be overlooked, and in this 
case, we submit that no act of Saunders, as reflected by 
the testimony and the evidence, constituted a breach of 
duty. The law imposes no obligation upon Saunders to 
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be unusually wary of Sin1pson n1erely because they were 
both dealers in used rnotor Ye hicles. Saunders had no 
reason to distrust Simpson, and had Simpson performed 
as he agreed to do the transaction would have met with 
everyone's satisfaction. The tort was that of Sirnpson, 
and Saunders was as rnuch injured thereby as anyone. 
We submit that the appellant does not sustain the bur-
den of showing Saunders to be a joint tort feasor with 
Jimmie Simpson. 
Left groping for straws then, in his frantie effort 
to pin the liability for the failure of Simpson on Saun-
ders rather than on the Bonding Company, the appel-
lant seizes upon the fact that Sunders signed as "Seller-
Dealer" when making application to Strevell Paterson 
Finance Company for a loan. Let us remember that 
Saunders has paid in full to Strevell Paterson Finance 
Company, admitting his liability in financing the loan, 
but the chasm in logic which appellant has failed to span 
is the connection between Bates an~ Saunders, either 
by way of contract or misrepresentation. Bates admitted 
that he signed the contract known as "purchase agree-
ment" (R. 270, Ex. 1 and B), in blank knowing and 
understanding that it was to be used in obtaining neces-
sary financing (R. 122, 125). Mr. Minson, manager of 
the automobile finance department of the Strevell Pater-
son Finance Company, testified that the signing as seller 
dealer was common practice with dealers doing business 
with Strevell Paterson Finance Company when they 
sought to finance a deal under circumstances such as 
this (R. 229-230). 
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Jones on Evidence, second edition, Vol. 4, P. 3261 
' Sec. 1770, states : 
"Consent to the filling of blanks is often 
implied where an instrument is signed and de-
livered and blank spaces are left unfilled. It has 
often been held in such cases that the holder 
has implied authority to fill the blanks in con-
formity to the general character of the, paper. 
Such authority has been implied in connection 
with blanks left in deeds, sealed instruments gen-
erally, simple contracts, * * * ." 
Saunders exercised this implied power to fill in the 
blanks in conformity to the general character of the 
paper, and did so exactly as it had been contemplated 
by Bates that someone would do, for the purpose of 
financing. The representations thus made by Saunders 
to Strevell Paterson Finance Company were authorized 
by Bates who gave the instrument in blank for the ex-
press purpose of securing financing. Bates cannot now 
be heard to complain of the representations so made, 
and Saunder~ lived up to his representations to Strevell 
Paterson Finance Company. We have in this case no 
demand by Strevell Paterson Finance Company. In this 
case both of the parties now seeking to fix responsibility 
and liability on Saunders made exactly the same mistake 
as did Saunde,rs ; they all trusted Simpson, and Simpson 
failed to perform. Such use of this instrument for the 
purposes afore-stated is freely admitted by Bates and 
by Saunders. Appellant takes the unusual position that 
Saunders and Bates cannot agree upon the true state 
of facts or testify thereto because of a written instru-
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ment used between them, it being further the contention 
of appellant that to give any explanation of that instru-
ment beyond the tenus thereof would be a violation of 
the parol evidence rule. Appellants cite no case in sup-
port of this unusual assertion that a third party can 
vary the agreed state of facts by raising a technical 
rule of evidence which neither of the parties involved 
have cared to assert. If such were the law a third party 
could prevent the original parties to a transaction from 
explaining the circumstances under which a document 
was made and given. The tendency of the court seems 
to be in exactly the opposite direction even though the 
parties directly involved themselves raise the objection. 
"The complicated dealings between many of 
those trafficking in and loaning money on auto-
mobiles have reached a point where the courts 
must strip transactions of their pretenses and 
look at them as they really are, with the camou-
flage of papers giving a similitude of passing 
title removed, or they will be dealing with fictions 
instead of facts. Those who buy and sell, bail 
and loan money on motor vehicles must be given 
to understand that the realities of their tran-
sactions will be sought for by the courts, they 
will look through the screen of paper titles to 
ascertain what was the real situation." Root v. 
Republic Acceptance Corporation, 123 A. 650, 
Supreme Court of Pa., 1924. 
It is upon these facts and principles of law that 
we conclude that no liability either to Bates or to the 
Appellant has been made out as against the respondent 
Saunders, and to this conclusion is added the weight of 
the trial court's decision. 
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POINT NO. II. 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT 
APPELLANT WAS LIABLE TO RESPONDENT SAUNDERS 
ON THE BOND OF JIMMIE SIMPSON IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. 
Heretofore in the argument under Porint I we 
have set forth in detail the facts adduced at the trial 
relating to the sale of the 194 7 Chevrolet Fleetline 
Sedan to respondent Bates, by Simpson. Jimmie Simp-
son as a licensed dealer in used motor vehicles under 
the laws of the state of Utah was bonded. It was stip-
ulated by counsel that the form and style of the bond 
is identical with Ex.12, R. 270, and that on such bond 
Jimmie Simpson was principal and the appellant was 
the surety ( R. 257; R. 28, second defense). It will be 
noted that the bond is a joint and several obligation, 
therefore, the appellant and Jimmie Simpson are both 
liable individually for loss resulting from breach of the 
conditions of the bond. By way of general authority 
for this statement we cite section 45 of American Juris-
prudence, Vol. 8 page 726: 
"Sureties Liability As PrincipaL-The rule 
is well settled that when principal and surety 
are bound jointly and severally on a bond, al-
though there is no express admission on the face 
of the instrument that all are principals, yet 
the surety cannot aver by pleading that he is 
surety only. Hence, when one who is in reality 
only surety is willing to place himself in the situ~­
tion of principal by expressly declaring upon his 
contract that he binds himself as such, it has been 
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held that there is no hardship in holding him 
to the character in which he assumes to place 
hin1self." 
The conditions of the bond are set forth therein as 
follows: 
I~XO\Y ~\LL ~[EN BY THESE PRE-
SEXTS : That we, ____________ of·-------------------~----------- as 
principal, and ______________________________ a surety company 
qualified and authorized to do business in the 
state of rta.h as surety, are jointly and severally 
held and firn1ly bound to the people of the state 
of r tah to indemnify any and all persons, firms 
and corporations for any loss suffered by reason 
of violation of the conditions hereinafter con-
tained, in the penal sum of __________________________ Dollars, 
lawful money of the Fnited States, for the pay-
ment of which, well and truly to be made·, we 
bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administra-
tors, successors and assigns, jointly, severally 
and firmly by these presents. 
The condition of this obligation is such, That, 
\\lhereas, the above bounden principal has ap-
plied for a license to do business as a--------------------
:Motor Vehicle ---------------------------- within the state of 
Utah, and that pursuant to the application a 
license has been or is about to be issued, 
Now, Therefore, if the above bounden prin-
cipal shall obtain said license to do business as 
such ------------------------ :Motor Vehicle---------------------- and 
shall well and truly observe and comply with all 
the requirements and provisions of the Act Prof-
viding For The Regulation And Control Of The 
Business Of Dealing In 1\Iotor \T ehicles, as pro-
vided by Chapter 67 Laws of Utah 1949, and 
indemnify any and all persons, firms and cor-
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porations for any loss suffered by reason of the 
fraud or fraudulent representations made or 
through the violation of any of the provisions 
of said Motor Vehicle Dealer's Act and shall pay 
all judgments and costs adjudged against said 
principal on account of fraud or fraudulent rep-
resentations and for any violation or violations 
of said law during the time of said license and 
all lawful renewals thereof, then the· above obli-
gations shall be null and void, otherwise to remain 
in full force and effect. (R. 270, Ex. 12). 
It will be observed that Section 13 of Chapter 67 
Laws of Utah 1949 sets forth the Act prohibited, and 
thereunder it is stated: 
"It shall be unlawful and a violation of this 
act for the holder of any license issued under the 
terms and provisions hereof: * * * (D) To vio-
late any law of the State of Utah now existing 
or hereafter enacted respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles or any lawful rule or regulation 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles promul-
gated by any licensing or regulating authority 
now existing or hereafter created by the laws 
of the state of Utah." 
By 57-3a-73 U.C.A.1943 it is provided: 
"Every manufacturer or dealer upon trans-
ferring a vehicle of a type subject to registration 
hereunder whether by sale, lease or otherwise, 
to any person other than a manufacturer or 
dealer, shall immediately give. written notice 
of such transfer to the department upon the offi-
cial form provided by the department. Every such 
notice shall contain the date of such transfer, 
the names and addresses of the transferor and 
transferee, and such description of the vehicle 
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as n1ay be called for in such official form." 
It is further provided by law at 57-6-5 U.C.A. 1943: 
Certificate of Title to Yendee. 
Every person, finn, or corporation upon the 
sale and delivery of any used or second hand 
n1otor vehicle shall within forty-eight hours there-
of deliver to the vendee, and endorsed according 
to law, a certificate of title, issued for said vehicle 
by the State Ta..x Commission. 
As a licensed and bonded dealer in used motor 
vehicles under the law of the State of Utah, Jimmie 
Simpson ·was required to comply with these provisions 
of the law and all other pertinent provisions. As has 
been shown he was specifically bonded so to do, and the 
appellant was the surety on that bond. Having sold the 
car to Haskel N. Bates, respondent herein, Simpson was 
then obligated to give notice to the department and 
furnish a certificate of title to Simpson in accordance 
with the provisions of the law above set out. Simpson 
did neither of these things. The record shows as previ-
ously set forth, that Simpson took the car turned in 
by Bates and sold the same (R. 270, Ex. 2 and 5). He 
alone received the proceeds of that transaction, Saun-
ders received nothing therefrom (R.170). 
When Saunders financed the transaction he turned 
over the money he received from the finance company 
to Simpson (R. 175 and 270, Ex. 7). Simpson was obli-
gated and required to obtain the certificate of title on 
the 19-1:7 Chevrolet sold to Bates and this he failed to 
do. It was testified by Saunders and was supported by 
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the testimony of the employee of the Continental Bank, 
Mr. Joseph Max Soelberg, that Simpson was the only 
one who could obtain the title from the Continental 
Bank (R. 177, 178, 251, 253). Saunders testified that 
he trusted Simpson ( R. 171). He had no reason not 
to trust him, just as the appellant and respondent Bates 
trusted him. Had Simpson performed as he agreed to 
do, and as he was bound by law to do there would be 
no grounds for this law suit. But Simpson failed to per-
form. He pocketed the money and he disappeared. 
As a result of this failure on the part of Simpson to 
obtain the title to the car and pay off the draft in his 
name at the Continental Bank in the amount of $1,225.00, 
Saunders was required to pay to Strevell Paterson 
Finance Company the amount of $867.75, which he did 
as testified to by Mr. Minson (R. 231, 270; Ex. 8). Saun-
ders thus suffered a loss amounting to $867.75, which 
amount is increased by his costs incurred in this action, 
and this loss resulted directly, proximately, and solely 
because of the failure of Jimmie Simpson to comply 
with the laws of this state as a licensed dealer in used 
motor vehicles, and in violation of the Act Providing For 
The Regulation And Control Of The Business Of Deal-
ing In Motor Vehicles. Since Simpson's failure con-
stituted a breach of the condition of the bond on which 
the appellant is surety, the appellant is liable to Saun-
ders for the loss which he suffered. And there is no 
need to argue the point as to whether Saunders pur-
chased the automobile, or the contract, as is done by the 
appellant, at page 44 of its brief, because Saunders 
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is a person protected under the tenm; of the bond, 
and the acts of Sin1pson were a violation of the con-
ditions of the bond. 
As to the ru.nount of the dmnage suffered, the appel-
lant raises a question at Point VI in his brief, where 
appellant claims that Saunders deducted $29.90 from 
the remittance which he made to Simpson, and that the 
judgment should not in any event be affirmed as to this 
amount. It is submitted that a review of the record will 
show that other than for passing reference to the ques-
tion of sales tax during the cross examination of Saun-
ders, nothing was ever raised at the trial on this point, 
and the trial court was never asked to rule thereon. 
We believe that it is generally accepted that an appeal 
does not lie from matters not ruled on by the trial court. 
If in preparing his appeal, appellant discovered that 
this claim should have been asserted, it is too late to 
draw the matter to the attention of the trial court at 
this time since no such claim was made in the pleadings 
or presented orally to the court. And it is much too 
early to assert that the trial court erred before the trial 
court has had an opportunity to pass upon the matter. 
A Point VII the appellant in its brief attempts to fix 
liability upon Saunders for the default of Simpson on 
the basis of the~ fact that both Simpson and Saunders 
were bonded by the appellant and that it became thei 
duty of Saunders to protect the appellant against loss 
because of and by virtue of the terms of the application 
for bond filed by Saunders. This is an action brought 
upon the bond of Simpson, not on the bond of Saunders. 
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The breach in the condition of the bond is Simpson's 
breach, there is no defalcation by Saunders. Simply 
because both men were bonded by appellant does not 
license appellant to use the obligations of both dealers 
interchangeably to suit the whim 9f the Assurance Cor-
poration. 
We have heretofore fully discussed the lack of lia-
bility from Saunders to Bates and since this is the 
premise upon which appellants argument is based it 
follows that the application of Saunders for his bond 
is irrelevant to the issues in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court should be sustained 
and the judgment of the court made and entered in 
favor of respondent Saunders and against Appellant 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN S. BOYDEN, 
ALLEN H. TIBBALS, 
.Attorneys for Respondent, 
W. J. Saunders. 
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